Lebanese Conflict: Lessons for Iraq

Koshan Ali Khidhir (Zamanee)

Introduction

The nature of conflicts in Lebanon and Iraq has much in common and it might be useful to compare them, in order to apply some lessons from the post conflict era in Lebanon to Iraq.

Iraq and Lebanon have similar heterogeneous sectarian divisions. For Lebanon, the Shiite, Sunni, and Christians represent the vast majority of the population.

For Iraq, it is the Shiite, Sunni, and Kurds. In Lebanon, the sectarian proportions are more equally divided. However in Iraq, the Shiite have majority having 60% of the population, and the Sunni and Kurds are about 20% each.

In both countries, the Shiite groups encountered suppression by former regimes, but they have power and political participation now. In both cases, the Shiite and Sunni groups were aided for supported by outside forces.

The focus of this essay would be about sectarian strife in both countries, then giving the theoretical framework for the conflicts. In addition, it will be suggested that sharing-power in Lebanon has been affective to normalize relations between different groups; the same method would be compatible for Iraq.

Historical Background of Conflict in Iraq and Lebanon

1- Civil War in Lebanon (1975 - 1990)

Lebanon has a long history with conflicts and wars. The last and the most crucial one would be the civil war that has started in 1975, and lasted for 15 years. The fighting was originally between a largely Maronite Christian force and an alliance of Muslim and left-wing groups, but the conflict soon expanded (Haddad, 2002, p.5).

Furthermore, neighbor states intervened in the conflict. The situation worsened with the presence of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon to fight the Palestinian group and to establish an Israel-friendly government there. The plan ended with the assassination of Bashir Gemayel, while he became president. There was presence of Israeli forces in Lebanon until 2000, when they were encountered by the Hizballah. Furthermore, Lebanon was under occupation of Syrian army from 1978 to 2005, following the assassination of Lebanese Premier Rafik Hariri (Warren & Troy 2011).

Lebanon is well known to be a harbor for other nations and forces. The Palestinian group has used Lebanon as a base to attack Israel. Israel, Syria, and Iran use Lebanon as a battlefield for their interests and protect their country. There is still proxy war in Lebanon, that neighbor countries have their proxies within Lebanon. For Syria, it was Amal and now Hizballah. For Israel, it was the South Lebanon Army. For Iran, it’s Hizballah (Ibrahim, 1998).

The fighting spread throughout the country, but Beirut, the capital, was particularly devastated. As the war progressed, intra-group fighting emerged, that caused the increasing of the death toll (Warren & Troy 2011).

The 15 years civil war killed an estimated 150,000 people, which is the nearly the same to 5% of Lebanon’s population, until 1990 (Ibrahim, 1998).

2- Sectarian Conflict Following the Invasion of Iraq

On March 20th 2003, the US and British forces invaded Iraq, entering Baghdad in April and capturing Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in December. In May, US President George W. Bush claimed an end to the major war effort despite an increasingly fierce urban insurgency (Hinnebusch, 2007, p.7).

The decision of dissolving Iraqi Army in 2003 by Paul Bremer, the top US civilian administrator in Iraq, caused 500,000 men army to be jobless then become terrorists in the region (Hinnebusch, 2007, p.11).

Roadside bombings and suicides became frequent and intense fighting took place during a November Coalition Siege of the rebel stronghold of Fallujah. The influence of other nations, especially Iran, is questionable in Iraq (Dassa, & Wehrey, 2009, p.42). In Iraq, Iran is the most affective and intervening country in Iraqi politics, then Americans, Saudia Arabia and Syria. However, after the withdrawal of Americans, the US will no more have real influence on Iraq. The Shiite groups, that are dominant, have good relations with Iran (Hoffman, 2006).
There are diverse statistics that shows the victims and death toll of the Iraq war and civilian conflicts. A study by American researchers at the Johns Hopkins University School of Public Health estimated that 100,000 civilian war-related deaths occurred in the 18 months that followed the invasion (Hinnebusch, 2007).

As the sectarian conflict between Shiite and Sunni was at its peak the same research study on October 2006 by these researchers estimated the total civilian death toll at 650,000. The war has also claimed the lives of thousands of combatants, including more than 3,000 US troops (Hinnebusch, 2007).

Theoretical Framework for Lebanese and Iraqi Conflicts

The most compatible theory that may give proper analyst to internal conflicts in Lebanon and Iraq would be the theory of “protracted social conflict” by Edward Azar (Tar, 2011).

According to Azar protracted social conflict is “ongoing and seemingly irresolvable” type of conflict. He lays down propositions on protracted social conflict that detail features and characteristics of these conflicts as well as causes, and reasons for recurrence (Ramsbotham, et al. 2011, pp.99-101).

In addition to this, Azar emphasizes that the most useful unit of analysis in protracted social conflict is the identity group- racial, religious, ethnic, cultural, and others (Ramsbotham, et al. 2011, p.101).

This category of conflict is very common in the Third World. Empirical data collected by Azar suggested that 90% of conflicts since the Second World War have taken place within the Third World and have been protracted social-ethnic rather than strategic conflicts (Ramsbotham, et al. 2011, p. 103).

Azar shed light on the importance of the power in the society, that dominant groups exploit it to eliminate the identity of minority groups. In other words, for Azar protracted social conflicts are ideological in nature, with strong preference for secession, national liberation, the rights of self-determination, autonomy or equal rights (Tar, 2011).

Protracted social conflict have two major sources: a deformed and polarized environment, and the denial or lack of basic needs, including security, physical, economic and cultural, identity and recognition (Ramsbotham, et al. 2011, p. 104).

The theory may be implied to the case of Lebanon and Iraq.

In the case of Iraq, sectarian violence emerged when Saddam Hussein came to power 1979. In this case, the violence was unilateral, that mostly state dominant, with Hussein’s Sunni-Baathist government brutally oppressing both Shiite and Kurds over the years.

Nowadays, all different parties have opportunity to express themselves, the different ethnic and religious groups are still learning to coexist. In Iraq, the Shiite and Kurds are weary of the Sunnis, who treated the Kurds so poorly when they were in charge of the country.

In Lebanon, the Sunnis and the Christians were the dominant groups. The levels of oppression and violence against minorities were not so much like in Iraq. This situation reaffirms Azar’s theory, for having protracted social conflict in an atmosphere that there is inequality, and ethnics are forced by dominant power (Tar, 2011).

At the same time the Shiite of Lebanon were marginalized and their people allocating insufficient portion of state resources (Hazran, 2010, p. 7). The basic needs and economic disputes, may be one of the main factors for this kind of conflict, as Azar mentioned (Tar, 2011).

In both cases, there are still tensions between different groups. However, all groups figure out that the best way for stabilization is having cooperation and dialogue. The situation in Lebanon is much better than in Iraq, that Iraq would be able to get some lessons from that country. The following part of the essay suggests a solution for the ethnic and internal conflict in Iraq.

Power-Sharing in Lebanon: lessons for Iraq

Lebanon has long history and experience of power-sharing, and the last effort was the Ta’if Agreement. The agreement and power-sharing would be roadmap for normalization in Iraq.

In 1989, members of the Lebanese Parliament met in Ta’if, Saudi Arabia, to negotiate an end to the civil war. Finally, they reached Ta’if Agreement.

Although the basic power-sharing nature of Lebanon’s institutions remained unchanged, reforms changed the powers of the presidency and council of ministers and the composition of parliament. By 1991 the war had erupted and most parties has agreed to the articles of the Ta’if Agreement (Maila, 1994, p.45).

The conflict parties were not the principal negotiators who arranged the power-sharing arrangement of the post-conflict Lebanese state. Lebanese members of parliament, who had been elected in 1972 and who for the most part had been witnesses and observers rather than actors in the civil war, negotiated the Ta’if Agreement (Maila 1994, 37). The Ta’if Agreement maintained and reaffirmed the broad outlines of the older power-sharing system, but redistributed domestic political power among the major groups, Maronite, Sunni, and Shiite. It shortened the powers of the Maronite President (Harik 1991, 45-56), entrusted most executive powers to the Council of Ministers, and increased the power of the legislature and especially that of the Shiite House Speaker. Ta’if replaced the old 6:5 distribution of seats in Parliament by an equal distribution between Christians and Muslims; it also increased the number of seats in parliament from 99 to 108 and eventually to 128 (Hazran, 2010, p. 12).

The agreement has also clarified the nature of relations between Lebanon and Syria: it stipulated that any agreements between Syria and Lebanon shall “realize the interests of the two filial countries within the framework of the sovereignty and independence of each” (Salem 1991, 71).

In addition, Ta’if called for introducing a number of reforms including administrative decentralization, a new electoral law, reinforcing national integration and identification of education and teaching, the establishment of an economic and social development council, law and regulation of the media, and to re-assert the liberation Lebanon from Israeli occupation (Maila, 1994).

Ta’if sought to change the rule of individuals to the rule of institutions; thus, executive powers were taken away from the presidency and given to the government (Krayem 1997, 426-427). This process needed time to be implemented, President Ilyas Hrawi insisted on attending all meetings of the council of ministries (Mansour 1993, 204-207).

The case of power-sharing in Lebanon could be seen as an example for Iraq. The Iraqi political parties need a practical agreement to distribute the power among different groups and ethnics. The power should be settled, instead of having disputes over power. If the power has distributed, the security and political future of Iraq would be stable (Denselow, 2010).

It may be easier for Lebanon, that proportions of different ethnics are mostly the same, to have the Ta’if Agreement for distribution of power. At the same time, in Iraq the distribution may be made on the base of election results or census. The distribution could be settled among the main parties and groups, in order to have stable political atmosphere.

Nevertheless, the agreement shed light on the relations with neighbor countries and the future of relations, Iraq has to have the same clear position in relations with neighbor countries. It was mentioned that Iran has affect on politics of Iraq, but this has not been regulated through any law or agreement. In addition, Iranian politicians denied these influences. However, clear agreement could restrict the interventions of Iran (Marr, 2004, p.272).

There is one more issue in Iraq, which is dispute over resources. There would be some articles of the agreement for distribution of resources or at least mandating of redistributing of these resources equally among ethnics (Oberg & Strom, 2008).

Conclusion

The cases of Lebanon and Iraq are mostly the same. The comparison between them would be useful to share experiences.

This essay has tried to shed light on the historical background of civil war and internal conflict in Iraq and Lebanon. Then it has mentioned reasons and causes of war. Edward Azar’s Theory of protracted Social Conflict, has been given to analyze and give a framework for the conflicts in Lebanon and Iraq. The theory has been implemented and examples been given to clarify the situation, especially in Iraq.

Finally, the Ta’if Agreement has been elaborated as a successful example for power-sharing. The article suggested having an agreement between all political parties in Iraq, practical distribution of power, and distributing resources among different ethnics. The dominant groups in Iraq should realize the importance of listening to minority groups in order to prevent political discontent and possible future destabilization.

References

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Koshan Ali Khidhir (Zamanee) is a journalist, blogger, and student at the University of Kurdistan-Hawler. He has written articles for Global Politician, American Chronicle, Middle East Online, Mideast Youth and others. His blog can be read at: koshanali.blogspot.com

This article has been published on Global Politician:
http://www.globalpolitician.com/27377-lebanon-iraq-conflict

REVIEW of Kenneth Campbell's "A Tale of Two Quagmires: Iraq, Vietnam, and the Hard Lessons of War"

Koshan Ali Khidhir (Zamanee)


Kenneth J. Campbell, A Tale of Two Quagmires: Iraq, Vietnam, and the Hard Lessons of War, United States: Paradigm Publishers, 2007; 136 pp; ISBN: 978-1-59451-352-7.

Kenneth Campbell is an associated Professor of Political Science and International Relations and Director of the International Relations Program at the University of Delaware. He served with the US Marines in Vietnam and later joined the Vietnam Veterans against the War.


Whether Iraq is another Vietnam or not, is the first question that the author begins with. He shares different perspectives of scholars regarding the similarities and dissimilarities between Vietnam and Iraq. Some scholars affirm that Iraq, similar to Vietnam, was becoming another quagmire for the US that ultimately has to pull out in humiliation defeat. However, other scholars assert that Iraq, unlike Vietnam, US forces will eventually triumph over Iraq. The author claims that Iraq and Vietnam are exactly alike -on the strategic and political level- it was another quagmire for the US As the author mentioned quagmires “are built upon the quicksand of deception, deception about purpose, progress, methods, and exit.” (p. 9)


In this book, the author, who served in the Vietnam War for thirteen months and studied the war for thirty years, shed light on difficulties and torments of the War. Who suffered heatstroke, dysentery, malaria, trench foot, and jungle rot, but while they were fighting they forget about everything and they were fighting for their lives. Counting bodies, was the main strategy of military, and high enemy body counts made their superiors to be happy, in contrast low or no body count made them to be unhappy. As the war burden and soldiers experienced difficult situations, they started to “hate the war” and they just want to go home “alive” (p. 34). The author was to angry about the Vietnam debacle and started to say “I could not live with the lies any longer.” He affirms “Why we were in Vietnam”, the “progress” of the U.S forces and the way they treated the Vietnamese “was a lie.” (p. 37)


In Chapters three and four, the author focuses on the Vietnam War and its lessons. The author is angry about effects of the Vietnam War in the US The author declares that the War divided the US bitterly and deeply, failed two presidents and polarized Congress and paralyzed the courts. The author claims that US political and military leaders deceived the nation about justification of the war. As he uncovers that from 1964 to the mid of 1965s the US wanted Vietnamese military leaders to be capable enough to govern Vietnam under Washington’s guidance. Failing this, the US decided to take direct control over the war. Then, “the Johnson administration manufactured the Gulf Tokin incidents” (p. 45) in order to rally American people to support direct US military intervention in Vietnam. These facts were not officially confessed until thirty years later (p. 45). Moreover, the methods of fighting by the US military were essentially illegal and immoral. In order to obtain intelligence, they were torturing prisoners and detainees, the use of “fists, knives, pistols, and rifle buttes during the interrogation of Viet Cong suspect” (p 49). The author has no doubt that the Vietnam War was not about helping Vietnamese. The US political and military leaders were mainly concerned about beating other super power, the Soviet Union.


The lessons of Vietnam War according to the author classified into five schools of thought, Conservative, Liberal, Far Left, Far Right, and the Military. The Conservative school suggests that the main lesson from Vietnam debacle should be learned was the necessity of realizing the power limits of any nation, even superpowers like the US, to control the course of world event. For the Liberal School of thought, the principal lesson was the long-lasting significance of law, democracy, morality, and personal responsibility. The Far Left school which offers perhaps the most important lesson to be learned, states that poor people, if united, will never defeated by greedy capitalists. The Far Right School suggests that the US must ignore international legal and moral restrictions and use all superior US military power. Finally, the Military School advised US military and civilian leaders never to forget the strategic relationship between military force and domestic political support in initiating, maintaining, and winning a distant, gory war. The author also, mentions two other lessons by scholars, policy analysts, and policy makers. They declared the war with having uncertain purpose decreases nation’s public support as causalities among its troops rise. Public opinion is, also, another essential character, if the public opinion falls, other vital characters in the US political system being falling as well.


The last two chapters are dedicated to the Iraq War. The author declares that Bush administration’s War on Iraq has become another “Vietnam-like quagmire.” Bush’s war in Iraq, he explains, is “a war of choice, not necessity” (p. 73). Therefore, it is illegal and immoral war. Bush had unsound purpose for the Iraq War. Therefore, it is expected that the war certainly produced failed tactics and strategy for fighting the war. The leaders of the war would do their best to reform strategy and tactics, but it will still be a failed war. The author affirms that Iraq War had nothing to do with terrorism. He claims that 9/11 was simply convenient excuse, for neoconservatives, to wage the Iraq War. They desired “for years before 9/11 to invade and conquer Iraq as a prelude “transforming” the entire Middle East into a solidly pro-US, pro-Israel region” (p. 75). Therefore, the reliable evidence is to be found in the writings of scholars, analysts or in the words of neoconservatives. The first attempt by neoconservatives to dominate over the world was in 1992, during the George H. W. Bush Administration. Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, ordered Neocon Paul Wolfowitz and Zalmay Khalilzad, to prepare a draft “Defense Planning Guide” that clearly aimed to prevent the rise of any challengers to US global hegemony in any region of the world. But Bush rejected the plan (p. 77). During the Clinton administration years, neoconservatives continued with their plan. Once they were back to power with the George W. Bush administration, they tried to implement their plan to get rid of Saddam Hussein Regime. The author affirmed that “Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz argued for war against Iraq four days after 9/11 at an emergency meeting”; Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz “asserted that there was 10 to 15% chance that Saddam was behind the attack on 9/11” (p. 80).
After the essential victorious march in Baghdad in 2003, then the Bush Administration tried to convince the public opinion of the US that Saddam regime was defeated and Iraqi resistance was just its last throes. Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld and others in the Administration called Iraqi resistance fighters as terrorists, who were violently fighting US forces. During 2006-2007 as the war rose and US causalities risen, public support for the war declined. Similarly to the Vietnam War, US forces tutored detainees and intentionally killing unarmed Iraqi civilians. For instance “the Bush administration claimed that the abuses at Abu Ghraib were carried out by just a “few bad apples” in the Army” (p.86). But the investigation of Seymour Hersh, a journalist that published his investigation on New Yorker Magazine Web site, revealed that US torture was systematically applied in Iraq, Afghanistan, in Cuba, and in secret interrogation centers around the world (p.86). The sexual abuses of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib can be labeled as a greatest shame to be done by the US Army. Some military analysts observed that the US troops treatment of their enemy in Iraq was fault because they were confused about who were their enemy was strives a spectacular charge as the US troops went through in the Vietnam War.


The author indicates that lessons of Vietnam debacle are reaffirmed in Iraq War. Firstly, if the political purpose of a war contradicts the nation’s potential values, the nation will not be patient about it for a long time. On the other hand, the US should be concerned about the relevance of, and complications of, its actions on international law. Domestically, the importance of protecting US constitutional law, and the significance of multilateralism in foreign policy are viewed to be further crucial issues.


Throughout the basic, the author holds pessimistic view of the Iraq and Vietnam Wars. He accuses the US political military leaders of deceiving the US public regarding reasons of these two wars and the ‘progress’ or ‘success’ they achieved. There is no doubt that some “strategic and political” antecedents of these wars are similar, but the US causalities in Vietnam War were more than ten times that of Iraq. The author provides solid data about Saddam’s regime not having relation with terrorist groups, but he did not shed light on the security situation after the Iraq war, which become flooded of host of terrorist organizations. He did not mention the decision of dissolving Iraqi Army by Paul Bremer, the top US civilian administrator in Iraq, that caused 500,000 man army to be jobless then become terrorists. The author did not mention the interference of neighboring countries in Iraqi politics by supporting Shiite and Sunni entities, which spoiled Iraqi political and security situation. While the author mentions that Iraqi government has been created by the US, he did not mention progress regarding holding elections and the formation of Iraqi government. Thus, it can be said that the author exaggerates when he demonstrates the situation of the US Army in Iraq.




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